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SUPREME COURT PREQUEL: JUSTICE STEVENS ON 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Stefanie A. Lindquist 
ABSTRACT—Justice Stevens’s retirement from the U.S. Supreme Court has 
occasioned numerous retrospectives on his lengthy career as a Supreme 
Court Justice. Yet Justice Stevens’s career began on the Seventh Circuit and 
his voting behavior and doctrinal positions on the circuit court provide a 
unique window into his judicial character and the roots of his thinking on 
important issues that continued to preoccupy him on the Supreme Court. In 
this Essay, I first analyze then-Judge Stevens’s voting behavior on the court 
of appeals by examining the frequency with which he wrote separate 
opinions, as well as his voting interagreement with his colleagues on the 
circuit bench. I then discuss the doctrinal positions taken by Judge Stevens 
in several substantive areas, including substantive due process, gender 
discrimination, and election law, noting how those positions were often 
reiterated in Justice Stevens’s opinions on the Supreme Court. The Essay 
concludes that Judge Stevens, like Justice Stevens, was extremely 
independent in his voting behavior. In terms of the ideological direction of 
his votes, Judge Stevens’s votes did not follow a clear pattern; instead he 
was iconoclastic and unpredictable. Nevertheless, positions taken by Judge 
Stevens in several cases sounded themes and principles upon which he 
continued to rely even until his final term on the Supreme Court. 
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“There is something about the man that suggests he is capable of 
holding strong views and holding them independently, if need be. And 
with spark.”† 
INTRODUCTION 
The retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens from the U.S. Supreme 
Court has resulted in a number of articles and symposia offering a 
retrospective on, and a celebration of, the Justice’s long career on the 
Court.1 Focused as they are on Justice Stevens’s Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, most of these retrospectives do not reflect on Justice John 
Paul Stevens’s record as judge on the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. In this Essay, I argue that careful examination of then-
Judge Stevens’s decisionmaking on the Seventh Circuit offers intriguing 
insights into the Justice’s judicial character and provides a useful roadmap 
to the development of his philosophy in several substantive areas of law. 
This Essay begins in Part I by describing Judge Stevens’s voting behavior 
on the Seventh Circuit, with a focus on his interactions and voting 
alignment with his brethren on that court. In Part II, I turn to several 
substantive areas in which Judge Stevens’s circuit court opinions are 
notable, either because they expressed doctrinal positions that continued to 
represent Justice Stevens’s views on the Supreme Court or because they 
demonstrate how his views have evolved over time. The Essay concludes 
by considering the ways in which Judge Stevens’s record on the Seventh 
Circuit sheds light on his judicial character and philosophy, which 
ultimately shaped Justice Stevens’s record on the Supreme Court. 
 
†  Jerald terHorst, Justice Stevens Faces Toughest Test, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 28, 1975, at A6. 
1  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vision of John Paul Stevens, TRIAL, July 2010, at 48; Eugene 
R. Fidell, Justice John Paul Stevens and Judicial Deference in Military Matters, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
999 (2010); Linda Greenhouse, Justice John Paul Stevens as Abortion-Rights Strategist, 43 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 749 (2010); Aram A. Schvey, Human Rights Hero: Justice John Paul Stevens, 36 A.B.A. SEC. 
INDIVIDUAL RTS. & RESPS. 25 (2009); Christopher E. Smith, Justice John Paul Stevens and Capital 
Punishment, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 205 (2010); Editorial, John Paul Stevens: A Judicial Role Model, 
94 JUDICATURE 4 (2010). 
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I. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT: 1970–1975 
Justice Stevens’s judicial service began five years prior to his 
confirmation as a Supreme Court Justice when he was appointed by 
President Richard Nixon to fill a vacancy on the Seventh Circuit.2 At the 
time of his Seventh Circuit nomination, then-Judge Stevens was fifty years 
old and a partner in the Chicago firm of Rothschild, Stevens, Barry, and 
Myers. Judge Stevens’s confirmation to the Seventh Circuit was 
noncontroversial. Although appointed by President Nixon, Judge Stevens’s 
nomination to the circuit was championed by his former University of 
Chicago classmate Senator Charles Percy, viewed at the time as one of the 
“liberal voices” in the Republican Party.3 As a result, his selection had no 
clear ideological valence, nor did Judge Stevens’s record as an attorney 
suggest one.4 His confirmation hearing, scheduled with five other judges, 
lasted just over an hour and was described as “little more than a formality.”5 
Judge Stevens took the oath of office for his circuit court seat on 
November 2, 1970 and decided his first case by December 1 of that same 
year.6 He joined a circuit court comprised of seven active judges including 
five Democratic and two Republican appointees, with one vacancy caused 
by the decision of Eisenhower appointee Latham Castle to take senior status 
in early 1970. In 1971, Nixon filled Castle’s seat with Judge Robert A. 
Sprecher, thus maintaining the 5–3 Democrat-to-Republican-appointee 
balance on the circuit. Judge Luther M. Swygert, a Kennedy appointee, was 
serving as chief judge at the time of Judge Stevens’s appointment. Other 
judges on the circuit in November 1970 included Kennedy appointee Roger 
J. Kiley; Johnson appointees Walter J. Cummings, Thomas E. Fairchild, 
and Otto Kerner, Jr.; and Nixon appointee Wilbur F. Pell, Jr.7 
 
2  Judge Stevens filled a vacancy caused by the death of Judge Elmer J. Schnackenberg on 
September 15, 1968. See, e.g., U.S. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, JUDICIAL 
CHRONOLOGY, available at http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/Judges_Chronology.pdf; Elmer J. 
Schnackenberg, On U.S. Bench in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1968, at 47. Judge Schnackenberg 
had been appointed by President Eisenhower in a recess appointment in 1953. See, e.g., RAYMAN L. 
SOLOMON, HISTORY OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, 1891–1941, at 174, 179 (1981) (detailing the recess 
appointment); 5th Assistant Head Named in Post Office Department, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1953, at 34. 
3  Percy Praises Court Choice, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 29, 1975, at S5. 
4  Justice Stevens practiced antitrust law and was involved in a high-profile corruption investigation 
and prosecution involving Illinois State Supreme Court justices; he served as special prosecutor for the 
Greenberg Commission, named by the Illinois court to conduct the investigation. But far from 
politicizing Justice Stevens, his (unpaid) service to the Commission catapulted him to prominence in 
Illinois because of his vigorous prosecution of corruption in the interests of the rule of law. See 
generally KENNETH A. MANASTER, ILLINOIS JUSTICE: THE SCANDAL OF 1969 AND THE RISE OF JOHN 
PAUL STEVENS (2001) (discussing the impact of the investigation and trial on Justice Stevens). 
5  5 Judge Choices Are Unopposed, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1970, at A8. 
6  See United States ex rel. Mazenis v. McBee, 435 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). 
7  See U.S. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, supra note 2. 
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With two prominent exceptions, this membership of active judges on 
the Seventh Circuit remained relatively constant until 1974. Judge Otto 
Kerner, Jr. took a leave of absence from the circuit in December 1971.8 His 
seat was not filled until January 1975, when Judge William J. Bauer was 
elevated to the circuit court by President Ford.9 The second change occurred 
in 1974, when Judge Kiley took senior status and Nixon appointed Philip 
W. Tone to fill Kiley’s seat.10 Judge Tone had clerked for Justice Wiley 
Rutledge on the Supreme Court in the Term following Justice Stevens’s 
clerkship on the Court11 and was himself on President Ford’s short list for 
the seat vacated by Justice William O. Douglas and ultimately filled by 
Justice Stevens.12 Judges Tone and Stevens served together on the circuit 
court for only a year-and-a-half before Judge Stevens left for his Supreme 
Court commission on December 17, 1975. 
TABLE 1: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, 1970–197513 
Circuit Judge Appointing President Years on Circuit JCS Score 
Cummings Johnson 1966–1986 -0.623 
Fairchild Johnson 1966–2007 -0.498 
Kerner Johnson 1968–1971 -0.379 
Kiley Kennedy 1961–1974 -0.623 
Pell Nixon 1970–2000 0.415 
Sprecher Nixon 1971–1982 0.006 
Stevens Nixon 1970–1975 0.168 
Swygert, C.J. Kennedy 1961–1988 -0.623 
Tone Nixon 1974–1980 0.006 
 
Table 1 provides information about the active judges on the Seventh 
Circuit during Judge Stevens’s tenure from November 1970 to December 
 
8  Judge Kerner was indicted on a number of federal charges—including bribery, mail fraud, and tax 
evasion—for actions taken while he was governor of Illinois and for which he was convicted following a 
trial in 1973. He formally resigned from the Seventh Circuit in 1974 and served three years in prison. 
For an in-depth examination of Kerner’s career, see generally BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, 
KERNER: THE CONFLICT OF INTANGIBLE RIGHTS (1999) (examining Judge Kerner’s early life, career, 
and prosecution). 
9  See U.S. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, JUDICIAL CHRONOLOGY, supra 
note 2. 
10  See id. 
11  Justice Stevens clerked for Justice Rutledge during the 1947 Term; Judge Tone clerked during the 
1948 Term. SOLOMON, supra note 2. 
12  Lesley Oelsner, 4 Men Named in High Court Search, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1975, at 16. 
13  Judge Castle took senior status on February 26, 1970; Judge William J. Bauer was appointed by 
President Ford in 1975 to fill the seat left by Judge Kerner’s formal resignation in 1974. See U.S. 
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, JUDICIAL CHRONOLOGY, supra note 2. 
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1975.14 Because of Kerner’s leave of absence in late 1971, Democrats 
enjoyed a de facto majority of one judge throughout most of the period. To 
further elucidate the ideological composition of the circuit, Table 1 also 
lists the Judicial Common Space (JCS) scores assigned to the individual 
judges.15 JCS scores are widely used in empirical studies of the federal 
courts.16 Based on an empirical model derived by Keith Poole,17 the scores 
represent judges’ ideological predispositions as measured by the ideological 
scores of their appointing president or of the home-state senator of the 
president’s party.18 Ideological preferences range from –1 to +1; increasing 
values on this variable indicate increasingly extreme conservative 
preferences.19 Although the zero point on this scale has no inherent 
meaning, it generally separates liberal judges from conservative judges. 
Note that, according to the JCS scores, Judge Stevens was the second 
most conservative judge on the Seventh Circuit, but this estimate probably 
reflects a more conservative score for him than is appropriate. In November 
1970, two Republican Senators served Illinois. The first was Senator 
Charles Percy, Judge Stevens’s University of Chicago classmate.20 The 
second was Senator Ralph Tyler Smith, who was far more conservative 
 
14  See id. 
15  For a database of JCS scores for circuit court judges serving between 1953 and 2006, see Lee 
Epstein, U. S. CAL., http://epstein.usc.edu/research/JCS.html (last visited June 12, 2012) (follow links 
for the data). 
16  See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007); 
Micheal W. Giles et al., Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 
POL. RES. Q. 623 (2001); Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of 
Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319 (2009). 
17  See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, IDEOLOGY & CONGRESS (2d rev’d ed. 2007) 
(analyzing data using NOMINATE common space scaling to represent ideological predispositions of 
presidents, representatives, and senators); see also VOTEVIEW.COM, http://www.voteview.com (last 
visited June 12, 2012) (providing data gathered through the various research projects of Keith Poole and 
Howard Rosenthal). 
18  Judicial Common Space scores reflect a mathematical transformation of the Giles, Hettinger and 
Peppers scores, explained as follows in a recent text: 
 In light of presidential prerogatives in the appointment process, Giles and his colleagues assign 
each judge appointed to the circuit bench in the absence of senatorial courtesy the Poole ideology 
score corresponding to his or her appointing president. However, for those judges appointed when 
there was one home-state senator of the president’s party, Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers give those 
judges the Poole ideology score corresponding to that home-state senator. When both home-state 
senators were of the president’s party, the corresponding ideology score for the judge is equal to 
the average Poole score of the two senators. 
VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 50–51 (2006); see also Epstein et al., 
supra note 16 (utilizing JCS data for positive political theory analysis); Giles et al., supra note 16, at 
626–27 (describing a study of the politics of selection to the lower courts that involves consideration of 
the role of senators and senatorial preferences). 
19  E.g., Epstein et al., supra note 16, at 307; Giles et al., supra note 16, at 631. 
20  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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than Percy.21 Judge Stevens’s JCS score—reflecting the average between 
Percy and Smith’s ideology scores—does not fairly reflect reality to the 
extent that Percy was primarily responsible for Judge Stevens’s 
appointment.22 Indeed, on the whole, Percy was remarkably nonpartisan in 
his support for judicial candidates, even adopting a unique merit system of 
selection based on a “novel policy of selecting professionally recommended 
lawyers and state appellate court judges who were not associated with his 
election campaigns.”23 Thus it is likely that the JCS scores improperly 
characterize Judge Stevens as the second most conservative member of the 
Seventh Circuit. In fact, as explained below, he was probably closer to the 
center and was perhaps even the median member of the circuit during his 
tenure. 
Judge Stevens’s confirmation to the Seventh Circuit thus did little to 
change the partisan balance on the court. The political dynamics of his 
appointment indicated that ideologically he was likely to vote closer to the 
center than to the hard right. Moreover, he joined a circuit whose active 
membership remained fairly constant throughout his tenure and that held a 
strong reputation as a leader in the protection of civil rights and liberties.24 
Contemporary commentary on the Seventh Circuit’s constitutional 
jurisprudence highlighted decisions rendered during Judge Stevens’s term 
on the circuit as evidence that the judges on the Seventh Circuit were 
vigilant in protecting civil rights. They point to cases from the early 1970s 
as proof of the court’s pro-civil rights credentials, particularly in the areas 
of free expression and racial discrimination.25 Indeed, the circuit’s liberal 
reputation continued throughout Judge Stevens’s tenure.26 Judge Stevens’s 
early judicial experiences therefore took place on a court whose judges 
championed constitutional and civil liberties and rendered decisions that 
reflected an expansive interpretation of those rights. 
 
21  See Adam Clymer, Charles H. Percy, Illinois Senator Who Clashed With Nixon, Is Dead at 91, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2011, at A26 (“Mr. Percy became closely identified with the more liberal wing of 
the party known as Rockefeller Republicans.”); Seth S. King, Illinois Speaker Succeeds Dirksen, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 18, 1969, at 1. 
22  See Percy Praises Court Choice, supra note 3 (noting that Senator Percy had originally 
recommended Justice Stevens for his position on the Seventh Circuit). 
23  Tom Littlewood, How Sen. Percy Exercises Prerogative in Nominating Judgeship Candidates, 
ILL. ISSUES, Apr. 1976, at 31, 31. 
24  Gregory A. Adamski & Stephen B. Engelman, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 52 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 246, 246 (1975) (“[T]he Seventh Circuit has long maintained a laudable reputation for its 
receptiveness to civil rights and civil liberties claims.”). 
25  See, e.g., Howard Eglit et al., Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 337, 338 
(1974) (concluding that the Seventh Circuit “vigorously adheres to the primacy of the right of free 
speech” and “a willingness to move to the outer edges of the law, if that movement was necessary or 
desirable to eradicate racial discrimination”). 
26  See id. (drawing generalizations based on an analysis of Seventh Circuit decisions). 
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II. VOTING AND OPINION WRITING ON THE CIRCUIT 
Table 2 sets forth the frequencies associated with Judge Stevens’s 
various forms of decisionmaking at the court of appeals. While on the 
Seventh Circuit, Judge Stevens participated in more than 100 cases per 
year. He wrote 165 majority opinions and over 60 concurring and 
dissenting opinions—thus producing a yearly average of about 45 
opinions.27 As is apparent from Table 2, Stevens frequently wrote separate 
concurring and dissenting opinions, with sixty-two dissenting and 
concurring opinions published from December 1970 to the time of his 
departure in late 1975. 
TABLE 2: JUSTICE STEVENS’S ACTIVITIES ON THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Activity Frequency 
Case Participations 587 
Three-Judge District Courts 5 
En Banc Participations 15 
Majority Opinions 165 
Concurring Opinions 21 
Dissenting Opinions 36 
Dissenting and Concurring in Part 5 
 
In his final years on the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens became the 
most frequent dissenter on the Court, “fil[ing] more dissents and separate 
opinions than any of his colleagues.”28 The data presented in Table 2 
suggest that Judge Stevens’s proclivity to dissent emerged during his career 
on the Seventh Circuit. But to fully evaluate Judge Stevens’s record as a 
dissenter or separate opinion writer on the circuit court, one must compare 
his record to his fellow judges’ voting behavior during the same period. To 
provide that comparative baseline, Table 3 sets forth data on the separate 
opinion-writing (or opinion-joining) behavior of the other active Seventh 
Circuit judges serving from 1971 through 1975.29 
 
27  These data were gathered from Westlaw by searching for “pa(stevens)” in the Seventh Circuit 
database, for the years 1970–1975. Each case was coded to reflect the type of participation and vote for 
each judge on each panel (i.e., whether the judge voted with the majority or separately and whether the 
judge wrote an opinion). The list of cases was then cross-checked against the list of cases provided by 
Green Bag as part of its “Sluggers” series. Sluggers: Cards & Stats, GREEN BAG, http://www.greenbag.
org/sluggers/sluggers/2010_stevens/Stevens_Statistics_-_Final.xlsx (last visited June 12, 2012). The 
numbers were analyzed in the various tables herein using Stata 10. Documentation on file with the 
author. 
28  Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 23, 2007, at 50. 
29  See infra note 32.   
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Column (1) provides statistics regarding these judges’ dissent rates in 
all cases decided during the relevant period. The dissent rates in Column (1) 
were calculated as the ratio of the number of dissents (and dissents in part) 
to the number of case participations in which the judge did not write the 
 
30  All judges listed served during the entire period except Judge Tone (1974–1975) and Judge Kiley 
(1971–1974). Judge Kerner was indicted and tried for bribery in 1972. Judge Bauer was appointed in 
1975 but participated in only one case with Judge Stevens. Data in Columns (1), (2), and (3) were 
gathered from Westlaw. Column (5) includes dissents and concurrences in part. 
31  This number does not equal the total number of “dissenting opinions” and “dissenting and 
concurring in part” provided in Table 2—forty-one opinions—because it includes only dissents from 
these eight judges. Table 2 includes decisions in which Judge Stevens also dissented from the opinions 
of other senior or visiting judges. 
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majority opinion.32 These ratios indicate that Judge Stevens’s dissent rate of 
close to 10% was among the highest on the circuit at that time, but he was 
not the most frequent dissenter.33 Both Judges Pell and Swygert shared 
Judge Stevens’s propensity to dissent, but Pell clearly led the group with a 
dissent rate of nearly 15%. Further information regarding these judges’ 
dissenting votes is provided in Columns (2) and (3), which set forth the raw 
number of dissents and concurrences (and the dissents and concurrences in 
part) written by each judge over the five-year period.34 
Again, these raw numbers indicate that Judge Pell exceeded Judge 
Stevens as the most frequent dissenter during the period of stable court 
membership from 1971 through 1975. Judge Swygert was not far behind 
Judge Pell. In comparison, other judges were far less willing to dissent. 
Even though Judge Cummings served throughout the entire five-year 
period, he was clearly disinclined to dissent from his brethren’s majority 
opinions (see Column (1)); the same conclusion holds for Judges Sprecher 
and Kiley. Judge Fairchild wrote separate opinions more often than these 
two judges, but apparently his preference was to concur rather than dissent 
in many cases—note that his ratio of dissents to concurrences is fairly 
balanced. Too few observations exist to draw any firm conclusions about 
Judges Kerner or Tone.35 
While Judge Stevens may not have been the most frequent dissenter 
during his time on the Seventh Circuit, his opinion-writing behavior 
reflected his independence in other ways. When cases are decided en banc, 
circuit judges often have the opportunity to join a dissent or concurrence 
written by a fellow judge. Of the sixty-two separate opinions written by 
Judge Stevens, none involved a situation in which he joined other Seventh 
Circuit judges in dissent from an en banc decision. Indeed, in all seven en 
 
32  Data to calculate these dissent rates were gathered from Westlaw using the PA and LE fields, 
limited to the years 1971 through 1975, to search for cases in which the judges participated but did not 
write the majority opinion. To identify the cases in which the judge wrote a majority opinion, the 
following Westlaw search was employed: (“judgename, circuit judge (dissenting” or “judgename, circuit 
judge (concurring” or dis(judgename) or con(judgename) and da(aft 1970) & da(bef 1976)). The list of 
cases thus produced was then evaluated to determine whether it was appropriate to include in the 
numerator. Thus, the dissent rate in Column (1) was calculated using as the denominator the number of 
opinions in which the judge was not the majority opinion writer (rather than all case participations) to 
enable comparison to the other statistics in Table 3. 
33  Some of the dissent rates in Table 4 are high indeed, especially at the courts of appeals (where 
unanimity tends to be the norm, see DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 107 (2000)). But around this time, the Seventh Circuit had one of 
the highest dissent rates among the federal circuit courts. See Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the 
United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491, 493 tbl.2 (1975) (showing the 
Seventh Circuit with the second highest dissent rate from 1965 through 1971, after the D.C. Circuit). 
34  The two numbers in Column (2) do not equate to the figure in Column (3) because of overlap 
between concurrences and dissents in part.  
35  As is clear from Table 3, Judges Kerner and Tone decided many fewer cases than other judges 
during the five-year period. 
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banc decisions in which Judge Stevens concurred or dissented, he wrote 
independent opinions that were often joined by one or two of his 
colleagues.36 In two of his fifteen en banc participations, Judge Stevens 
wrote the majority opinion.37 Thus, in 60% of the cases Judge Stevens heard 
en banc, he either wrote the majority opinion or a separate opinion 
explaining his unique rationale or conflicting judgment. Although the 
number of en banc observations is small, Judge Stevens’s activity in en 
banc cases provides a preview of his eventual behavior on the Supreme 
Court—particularly with respect to his propensity to express himself 
independently.38 
Table 3 also provides information regarding the dissenting behavior of 
judges on the Seventh Circuit on all panels on which Judge Stevens 
participated.39 A comparison of Columns (4) and (5) indicates that Judge 
Stevens was far more likely to dissent from his colleagues’ majority 
opinions than they were to dissent from his opinions. In fact, the dissent rate 
from Judge Stevens’s opinions is about half that of Judge Stevens’s own 
dissent rate. For all active judges except Judges Tone and Cummings, Judge 
Stevens’s dissent rate was higher than his overall dissent rate of 9.85%. 
Judge Stevens was therefore more likely to dissent from opinions written by 
his fellow active judges on the circuit than from opinions written by senior 
or visiting judges. 
As for other active judges’ choices to dissent from Judge Stevens’s 
majority opinions, the picture looks much different. Most judges appear to 
have deferred to Judge Stevens’s opinions, with the exception of Judge 
Sprecher and, most prominently, Judge Swygert. This is a curious finding, 
given that, in the en banc decisions, Judge Swygert often joined Judge 
Stevens’s separate opinions.40 
Differences between the percentages in Columns (1) and (5) reflect the 
degree to which the judge was more deferential to Judge Stevens than was 
typical in all cases. Again, when Judge Stevens authored the majority 
opinion, most judges dissented less frequently. In some cases, the difference 
 
36  See Drexler v. Sw. Dubois Sch. Corp., 504 F.2d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (Stevens, J., 
concurring); United States v. Rosciano, 499 F.2d 173, 175 (7th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (Stevens, J., joined 
by Swygert, C.J. & Sprecher, J., dissenting) (per curiam); Morales v. Schmidt, 494 F.2d 85, 87 (7th Cir. 
1974) (en banc) (Stevens, J., joined by Swygert, C.J. & Kiley, J., concurring); Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 
849, 857 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (Stevens, J., concurring in the result); United States v. Silvern, 484 
F.2d 879, 885 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (Stevens, J., concurring); United States v. Ponto, 454 F.2d 657, 
665 (7th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (Stevens, J., joined by Cummings & Sprecher, J.J., dissenting); Groppi v. 
Leslie, 436 F.2d 331, 332 (7th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (Stevens, J., joined by Swygert, C.J. & Kiley, J., 
dissenting), rev’d, 404 U.S. 496 (1972). 
37  United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc); Lucas v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 
466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972) (en banc). 
38  See Rosen, supra note 28 (describing Justice Stevens as the “great dissenter”). 
39  For an explanation of how these data were gathered, see supra note 27. 
40  See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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is dramatic: Judge Pell, for instance, has an overall dissent rate of almost 
15% but dissented from opinions written by Judge Stevens only 8.7% of the 
time. Clearly, to the extent that these judges dissented, they were often 
dissenting from majority opinions written by judges other than Judge 
Stevens. On the other hand, Judges Sprecher and Swygert were more likely 
to dissent from Judge Stevens’s majority opinions than they were to dissent 
from other judges’ opinions. With the exception of Sprecher and Swygert, 
therefore, judges on the Seventh Circuit were more likely to join Judge 
Stevens’s majority opinions.41 
It is only possible to speculate about the reasons for this trend. First, as 
a centrist, Judge Stevens may have taken moderate positions that satisfied 
judges both on his left and on his right—although in the case of Swygert, 
one of the most liberal judges on the circuit, this approach may not have 
been successful. Second, Judge Stevens may have accommodated potential 
dissenters via compromise.42 Finally, Judge Stevens may also have written 
such careful, thorough opinions that his colleagues found them persuasive. 
This final explanation finds some support in commentary about his record 
on the Seventh Circuit made at the time he was nominated to the Supreme 
Court. According to these observers, Stevens was a judge “esteemed for his 
judicial restraint” and for his careful readings of Supreme Court precedents 
that did not expand Court holdings beyond narrow boundaries.43 
The data in Table 3 provide some information about decisionmaking 
dynamics on the Seventh Circuit during Judge Stevens’s tenure, but they do 
not paint a complete picture of interagreement between Judge Stevens and 
his colleagues on the circuit bench. To provide a more comprehensive 
measure of such interagreement, I first computed the number of cases in 
which the named judge: (1) dissented (in whole or in part) from a majority 
opinion authored by Judge Stevens, (2) wrote a majority opinion from 
which Judge Stevens dissented (in whole or in part), or (3) voted for the 
opposite party in an en banc decision. This number then formed the 
numerator in a disagreement ratio, with the denominator representing the 
number of cases in which Judge Stevens participated with the named judge.  
For one judge in particular (Judge Kerner), the number of shared 
participations is sufficiently small as to render the ratio less reliable as a 
true indicator of agreement. The figures provided in Table 4 suggest that 
Judge Stevens was most likely to disagree with Judge Kerner, followed by 
Judges Swygert, Pell, and Kiley. In contrast, Judges Cummings and Tone 
were least likely to disagree with Judge Stevens. 
 
41  See supra text accompanying tbl.3. 
42  As we will see from his dissenting opinion in Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972), 
discussed infra note 58 and accompanying text, Judge Stevens expressed a preference for 
accommodation over confrontation as a means to resolve conflict. 
43  Glen Elsasser, Ford Nominates Judge in Chicago to Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 29, 1975, 
at 1. 
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TABLE 4: VOTING DISAGREEMENT STATISTICS 
Active Judge Disagreement with Judge 
Stevens (%, N) 
Percent Liberal in Votes on 
Judge Stevens’s Panels 
Cummings 7.4 (10/135) 37.78 
Fairchild 9.4 (10/106) 42.45 
Kerner 23.8 (5/21) 33.33 
Kiley 12.0 (13/108) 45.37 
Pell 12.5 (23/183) 37.16 
Sprecher 9.9 (14/141) 41.13 
Swygert 15.27 (22/144) 45.14 
Tone 2.5 (1/40) 32.50 
 
What might explain these variations? To be sure, these disagreement 
scores depend in part on the judges’ individual propensity to express 
disagreement with their colleagues’ majority opinions. Judges vary in their 
willingness to dissent, with some less likely to do so on grounds of 
collegiality or for other reasons.44 It is certainly possible that Cummings and 
Fairchild valued consensual decisionmaking more highly and thus chose to 
dissent less often. In the case of Judge Cummings, his belief that the court 
should “speak with one voice whenever possible” has been documented 
elsewhere.45 
Another explanation involves judges’ policy preferences: scholars 
frequently focus on ideology to explain deviations from unanimity in circuit 
court decisionmaking.46 To assess whether such ideological patterns help 
explain agreement among judges on the Seventh Circuit, each judge’s vote 
in all cases in which Judge Stevens participated was coded to determine its 
ideological direction using conventional methods developed by political 
scientists and following the directionality coding scheme used in connection 
 
44  See, e.g., HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 18, at 52, 66, 71 (showing that certain institutional roles, 
such as the role of chief judge, are associated with a reduced probability of dissent, perhaps because of 
concerns over collegiality). 
45  Chi. Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 743 (1994) (noting that Judge Cummings dissents and concurs very 
sparingly in interests of promoting consensus). 
46  See, e.g., HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 18, at 48–51 (explaining the importance of ideology as 
an explanatory variable for dissenting behavior); Lee Epstein et al., Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 114–16 (2011) (explaining the role of 
ideological attitudes in separate opinion writing by circuit judges); Goldman, supra note 33, at 494 
(suggesting that the political party of a circuit judge is the strongest indicator of voting in nonunanimous 
cases); Virginia A. Hettinger et al., Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting 
Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 123, 134–35 (2004) (noting the strength of 
attitudinal over strategic accounts of dissenting behavior). 
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with the U.S. Court of Appeals Database.47 The percent of liberal votes is 
included in Table 4; the relationship between liberal voting and agreement 
with Judge Stevens is graphically represented in Figure 1.48 
FIGURE 1: DISAGREEMENT WITH JUDGE STEVENS AND LIBERAL VOTING PERCENTAGES ON THE 


















The fitted line in Figure 1 indicates a possible relationship between a 
judge’s propensity to vote for a liberal outcome and rates of disagreement 
with Judge Stevens, but that relationship is not a particularly strong one. 
Without Tone—who, like Kerner, voted in a limited number of cases—the 
fitted line would be essentially flat. Indeed, Judge Stevens himself had a 
39% liberal voting record and his dissenting votes were even more liberal. 
Of his forty-one dissenting opinions, nineteen (or 46%) were classified as 
reflecting a preference for a liberal outcome.50 Judge Stevens thus appears 
to have been a moderate member of the circuit, perhaps less likely to agree 
with the more extreme liberal positions taken by his colleagues, but 
nevertheless willing to embrace liberal outcomes quite often in dissent. The 
 
47  See U.S. Court of Appeals Database Project, W. MICH. U., http://www.wmich.edu/nsf-coa (last 
visited June 12, 2012). 5% of the votes could not be reliably coded as either liberal or conservative 
because the issue areas did not fall into categories that enabled them to be coded under the protocol used 
in the U.S. Court of Appeals Database or because of crosscutting issues that rendered reliable coding 
impossible. 
48  For information about the data collection process to identify these cases, see supra note 27. 
49  Because Judge Kerner had so few recorded votes, his data point was not used to produce the 
fitted regression line in Figure 1. 
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portrait of his voting behavior on the circuit is thus of an iconoclast—
neither predictably liberal nor conservative. 
The voting data provided in this Part illuminate a few patterns. First, 
Judge Stevens’s career on the Seventh Circuit was marked by a willingness 
to dissent and, in the case of en banc dissents or concurrences, a possible 
reluctance to join others’ separate opinions. Indeed, as noted above, in his 
en banc participations, Judge Stevens wrote his own opinion (either as 
majority opinion writer, in concurrence, or in dissent) in nine of fifteen 
cases.51 Judge Stevens was clearly a judge who felt comfortable expressing 
his own views independent of his colleagues. At the same time, the 
quantitative data suggest that many of his colleagues found Judge Stevens’s 
views quite persuasive when he wrote majority opinions, with the particular 
exception of the very liberal Judge Swygert. But again, the evidence is not 
clear that liberalism was the defining difference between those with whom 
Judge Stevens agreed and those with whom he did not. Judge Stevens also 
dissented frequently from decisions by Nixon appointees Sprecher and Pell. 
In short, Judge Stevens’s opinion writing evidenced considerable 
intellectual independence, while his voting behavior on the circuit court was 
ideologically unpredictable. 
III. JUDGE STEVENS’S SEVENTH CIRCUIT JURISPRUDENCE 
At the time of Judge Stevens’s nomination to the Supreme Court, 
observers noted that he did not conform to a clear ideological mold. For 
example, Robert Boyd of the Chicago Tribune wrote, “If confirmed by the 
Senate, Stevens seems destined to join the right-center of the court lineup—
somewhere between Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William 
Rehnquist on the conservative end of the bench and the outnumbered 
liberals, Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, at the other 
end.”52 Law Professor Philip Kurland predicted that Judge Stevens would be 
where Justices Byron White and Lewis Powell were then ideologically 
positioned on the Court.53 A Chicago Tribune editorial similarly concluded 
that Judge Stevens’s reputation was “not engraved in stone as either a 
liberal or a conservative.”54 
Judge Stevens’s Seventh Circuit opinions reveal that he took some 
positions that seem surprisingly conservative—especially given our current 
perspective on Justice Stevens after his thirty-five years of decisionmaking 
on the Supreme Court. To some extent, of course, his decisions on the 
 
51  See supra text accompanying notes 36–37. 
52  Robert S. Boyd, Judge Stevens—His Views on Law, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 30, 1975, at 6. 
53  Ford’s Nominee to High Court Called Moderate, IND. EVENING GAZETTE, Dec. 1, 1975, at 6 
(“Asked where he thinks Stevens would fit politically on the high court [law professor Philip] Kurland 
said: ‘I think you’re going to find him with [Justices Byron] White and [Lewis] Powell.’” (second and 
third alterations in original)). 
54  Editorial, Judge Stevens’ Nomination, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 1, 1975, at 2. 
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circuit court were shaped by current events and by the salient legal issues of 
the time and thus may seem somewhat outdated to our modern sensibilities. 
For example, Judge Stevens decided several cases involving the regulation 
of hair length and facial hair in public schools, problems that have receded 
from public concern today but that nevertheless raised highly relevant 
issues of personal freedom in the 1960s and 1970s.55 Other decisions, 
however, retain their current relevance. As discussed below, Justice Stevens 
repeatedly cited his 1972 dissenting opinion in Cousins v. City Council of 
Chicago56 to explain his approach to claims of political or racial 
gerrymandering at the Supreme Court. The discussion below highlights 
Judge Stevens’s decisionmaking in three substantive areas of note: 
substantive due process, gender discrimination, and election law. I then turn 
to some overarching themes relating to the consequences of legal rules and 
institutional competence that emerge from these opinions. 
A. Substantive Due Process 
Judge Stevens grappled with substantive due process in two separate 
contexts—the first involving liberties claimed by students and employees in 
public schools and the second involving the right to privacy. In the school 
cases, Arnold v. Carpenter57 and Miller v. School District No. 167,58 Judge 
Stevens’s opinions exhibit sensitivity to the value of nonconformity but 
ultimately conclude that schools deserve considerable deference in the 
development of rules governing student and teacher conduct. In the privacy 
case, Judge Stevens struggled to define what he labeled the “so-called right 
to privacy,” again holding in favor of institutional prerogatives over 
individual rights. These cases thus cast a somewhat conservative shadow 
while at the same time including rhetoric that reflects Justice Stevens’s 
appreciation for the competing interests at stake. Indeed, Justice Stevens 
later relied on two of these opinions in advocating more liberal outcomes at 
the Supreme Court. 
In two cases decided in 1972 and 1974, Judge Stevens addressed the 
question of student or teacher freedom to wear long hair. In Arnold v. 
Carpenter, Stevens dissented from an opinion by Judge Kiley, which held 
that the hair provision of a school dress code was unconstitutional, even 
though the code (1) included an option for parents to provide written 
permission for their children to wear long hair and (2) was adopted by a 
majority vote of the students themselves.59 According to Judge Kiley, the 
parental consent provision neither independently cured the code’s 
 
55  Miller v. Sch. Dist. No. 167, 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974); Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 
(7th Cir. 1972). 
56  466 F.2d 830, 847 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
57  459 F.2d at 939. 
58  495 F.2d at 658. 
59  Arnold, 459 F.2d at 940–41. 
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constitutional defect nor eliminated the parent’s right to sue on the son’s 
behalf.60 Kiley concluded that the parent might have purposely withheld the 
permission required under the code so as “not to chill his son’s dissent from 
conforming to the requirements of the code.”61 Judge Stevens disagreed, 
arguing that the consent provision obviated the need for “judicial 
participation in the process of social change.”62 For Judge Stevens, parental 
support for a child’s nonconformity could be adequately accommodated by 
providing the consent required under the code. Because a child has no 
independent right to remain unwashed or unshorn without parental consent 
outside of school, the child should have no right to do so at school.63 He 
argued that accommodation, rather than confrontation, is the appropriate 
method to resolve social disputes because the latter only promotes 
intolerance: “Just as the majority must learn to tolerate the nonconformist, 
so must he learn to tolerate the transient customs of his elders.”64 
Judge Stevens was also unwilling to allow federal court interference in 
the case of Miller v. School District No. 167.65 In Miller, an untenured 
mathematics teacher sought judicial review of the school district’s decision 
to terminate his employment, which he claimed was improperly “motivated 
by disapproval of his beard and his sideburns.”66 As in Arnold, Judge 
Stevens refused to recognize an unfettered liberty interest in one’s 
appearance. And in fact, he argued that even if a liberty interest in 
appearance existed, it was of minor significance in “our constitutional 
constellation.”67 
Judge Stevens’s willingness to weigh the significance of the liberty 
interest in Miller, and find it wanting, was later rebuked by Chief Judge 
Fairchild in Pence v. Rosenquist.68 In Pence, a school bus driver was fired 
 
60  Id. at 943–44. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. at 945 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
63  Id. 
64  Id. In 1986, Justice Stevens cited his Arnold dissent in his dissenting opinion in Bethel School 
District No. 403 v. Fraser for the proposition that schools, rather than students, “must prescribe the rules 
of conduct in an educational institution.” 478 U.S. 675, 692 (1986) (Stevens, J. dissenting). But unlike in 
Arnold, in Fraser, Justice Stevens concluded that the school had failed to make clear that the student’s 
speech at issue could be subject to punitive consequences. Id. at 693. In Arnold, the student was clearly 
on notice regarding the school-imposed standard, 459 F.2d at 940–41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that the “code was adopted by a majority of the students” and “[p]arents were given written 
notice” of the requirements), but in Fraser, Justice Stevens argued, the student was not, 478 U.S. at 
693–96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In the latter case, therefore, Justice Stevens voted to uphold the 
challenge to the school’s decision to discipline the student for his “speech.” Fraser, 478 U.S. at 696 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
65  495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974). 
66  Id. at 659. 
67  Id. at 664 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
68  573 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1978). Judge Fairchild’s opinion was joined by Judge Wood; Judge Pell 
dissented in part. 
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for wearing a mustache and the district court invoked Miller to grant 
summary judgment to the school district on grounds that choices in style of 
appearance received only limited constitutional protection.69 “With all 
respect,” Chief Judge Fairchild wrote in reversing the district court, the 
Miller principle was “too sweeping” because it held “categorically” that 
personal appearance “[was] not significant enough to raise a constitutional 
issue” in the context of public employment.70 Judge Pell, on the other hand, 
read Miller more narrowly as holding only that federal courts should not 
enter the business of determining the rationality or irrationality of 
restrictions on a public employee’s liberty interest in personal appearance.71 
In both Miller and Arnold, one senses Judge Stevens’s concern that 
federal courts should not be involved in the regulation of student or 
employee hairstyle, which he viewed as a constitutional interest that was 
“not of the first magnitude.”72 We cannot know exactly how Justice Stevens 
would have treated regulations of personal appearance if faced with the 
issue when he served on the Supreme Court. The three cases that arrived at 
the Court in 1976 involving liberty interests in personal appearance were 
decided without Justice Stevens’s participation.73 In those cases, the Court 
upheld personal appearance regulations in public employment because they 
rationally furthered legitimate governmental interests74—an outcome it 
seems likely that Justice Stevens would have endorsed.75 And it seems 
unlikely that Justice Stevens would have agreed with the dissenters in the 
leading Supreme Court case who asserted that, “[i]n taking control over a 
citizen’s personal appearance, the government forces him to sacrifice 
substantial elements of his integrity and identity as well.”76 For Justice 
Stevens, federal judges should exercise caution before imposing their own 
views of educational policy on school administrators who must make 
 
69  Id. at 397, 399. 
70  Id. at 399. 
71  Id. at 400 (Pell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing Pence because it did 
not require such balancing). 
72  Miller, 495 F.2d at 665. 
73  This conclusion is based on a search of cases citing the lead Supreme Court opinion involving 
liberty interests in personal appearances, Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). The search revealed a 
total of two cases decided during the 1970s that cited Kelley. 
74  See Quinn v. Muscare, 425 U.S. 560 (1976) (per curiam) (dismissing certiorari as improvidently 
granted but noting outcome in Kelley); Kirwan v. Romano, 425 U.S. 929 (1976) (mem.) (vacating and 
remanding in light of Kelley); Kelley, 425 U.S. at 238 (holding restriction on policeman’s garb and 
appearance sufficiently rational under Fourteenth Amendment). 
75  Indeed, Judge Stevens sounded an irritated note in his Miller opinion when he observed that 
“those who choose not to conform to tradition in matters of appearance must anticipate . . . [that] other 
people may elect not to associate with them.” 495 F.2d at 665 n.29. 
76  Kelley, 425 U.S. at 251 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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localized judgments about factors that enhance the learning environment.77 
That school boards are locally elected also appeared to bolster his 
determination to exercise judicial restraint.78 
Perhaps Judge Stevens’s most interesting substantive due process case 
involves the right to privacy. Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital 
presented the question of whether a public hospital had the right to deny 
fathers access to the delivery room.79 The plaintiffs claimed that such access 
was protected by, in Judge Stevens’s words, the “so-called right of marital 
privacy.”80 As in the cases concerning hair length, Judge Stevens focused on 
the magnitude of the interest or right infringed by the hospital regulation 
forbidding fathers entry to the delivery room. In comparison to the right to 
choose to give birth, the right to determine “where, by whom, or by what 
method [the child] shall be delivered” was of a lesser magnitude.81 Given 
the less weighty constitutional interest, Judge Stevens chose to defer to the 
judgment of hospital officials and physicians who believed that admitting 
fathers could compromise sanitation in the delivery room.82 As with public 
school educational policies, hospital delivery room regulations were better 
left to hospital administrators and physicians with the necessary expertise: 
“[T]his is a classic example of the kind of situation in which individual 
hospitals should be permitted to make individual choices, rather than having 
an inflexible rule imposed upon all hospitals in the nation by federal 
judicial decision.”83 Judge Stevens’s humility about his own expertise in 
medical affairs, in combination with his acute sensitivity to the power 
wielded by the federal judiciary, led him to rule against the plaintiffs.84 At 
the same time, however, Judge Stevens recognized that certain interests that 
 
77  See also Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. Sch. Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4–5 (7th Cir. 1974) (emphasizing 
that school boards are in a better position to determine what policies are related to educational objectives 
than are federal judges). 
78  Justice Stevens’s deference to local decisions rendered by elected officials was also evident in 
Kelo v. City of New London. 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (declining to second-guess elected city government’s 
judgments about its redevelopment plan); see also JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET 
WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 356 (First Anchor Books 2008) (2007) (“Stevens styled his opinion [in 
Kelo] as an exercise in judicial restraint, as he deferred to the local elected officials about what 
constituted a public use.”); John Paul Stevens, Learning on the Job, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1561, 1566 
(2006) (noting that Kelo represented deference to state legislative and administrative bodies). 
79  523 F.2d 716, 717 (7th Cir. 1975). For an insightful discussion of Justice Stevens’s view of the 
right to privacy as originally enunciated in Fitzgerald, see Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to 
Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715 (2010). 
80  Fitzgerald, 523 F.2d at 721. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. at 721–22. 
83  Id. at 722. 
84  Judge Stevens’s argument did not persuade Judge Sprecher, who, in dissent, recognized that, 
while the right to delivery room access did not rise to the magnitude of abortion, neither did the 
hospital’s institutional interest in limiting access to a birth equate to the state’s interest in the life of an 
unborn child. Id. at 723–24 (Sprecher, J., dissenting). 
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are central to individual liberty and personal conscience deserved protection 
under the “so-called” right to privacy. Judge Stevens wrote in Fitzgerald 
that the right to privacy described by the Supreme Court “brings to mind the 
origins of the American heritage of freedom—the abiding interest in 
individual liberty that makes certain state intrusions on the citizen’s right to 
decide how he will live his own life intolerable.”85 
Although Fitzgerald produced an outcome that denied the 
constitutional claim, Justice Stevens subsequently cited language from his 
Fitzgerald opinion to support several cases of expanded civil liberties. 
Thus, in Washington v. Glucksberg,86 Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion 
invoked passages from Fitzgerald to emphasize a narrow reading of the 
majority opinion denying a facial challenge to a statute outlawing 
physician-assisted suicide. In particular, Justice Stevens cited his “origins of 
the American heritage of freedom” language to underscore his conviction 
that challenges to the law’s intrusion on personal autonomy might succeed 
in compelling circumstances.87 Similarly, in Bowers v. Hardwick,88 Justice 
Stevens’s dissent cited Fitzgerald in support of his argument that the right 
to privacy is best viewed as rooted in liberty interests protected by the Due 
Process Clause. Those liberty interests, as Stevens argued, “surely 
embrace[] the right to engage in nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others 
may consider offensive or immoral.”89 Yet again, Stevens quoted Fitzgerald 
in explaining his approach to substantive due process and incorporation in 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,90 as 
well as in the gun control case, McDonald v. City of Chicago.91 Clearly, 
Justice Stevens’s expression of his early views on the substantive content of 
the Due Process Clause continued to represent his perspective for the next 
thirty years and, as one scholar has argued, was a position that ultimately 
influenced the evolution of the Court’s privacy doctrine.92 
B. Gender Discrimination 
Justice Stevens’s Senate confirmation hearings for a seat on the 
Supreme Court produced few political fireworks, and he was confirmed by 
a unanimous vote.93 But one interest group did challenge Judge Stevens’s 
 
85  Id. at 720 (citing Eistenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)). 
86  521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
87  Id. at 744–45 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
88  478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
89  Id. at 217–18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
90  476 U.S. 747, 781 & n.11 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring), overruled by Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
91  130 S. Ct. 3020, 3092 (2010) (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
92  See Greene, supra note 79, at 732–34 (describing Justice Stevens’s influence on the development 
of constitutional privacy doctrine). 
93  Lesley Oelsner, Senate Confirms Stevens, 98 to 0, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1975, at 1. 
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record with considerable vehemence: the National Organization of Women 
(NOW). During her Senate testimony, NOW President Karen DeCrow 
criticized Stevens for having failed to sufficiently protect women’s rights 
while serving on the circuit court.94 She lamented: 
The NOW board is profoundly shocked that President Ford is not able to see 
the significance not only of not appointing a woman to the bench but of 
appointing a man who is so against women’s rights that he does not even 
understand the issues of civil rights for women in 1975.95 
In part, DeCrow’s objection to Judge Stevens stemmed from her 
dismay that Ford had not appointed a woman to the Court. But several of 
Judge Stevens’s decisions also offered cause for concern to organizations 
promoting women’s rights. 
One Title VII case in particular drew heightened attention from 
women’s groups at the time of Judge Stevens’s nomination.96 In Sprogis v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., Judge Stevens served on a panel that evaluated the 
constitutionality of United Air Lines’s (United) no-marriage policy for 
stewardesses.97 Judge Cummings’s majority opinion held that the policy 
violated Title VII and was not justified as a bona fide occupational 
qualification. Because the rule applied only to female stewardesses and not 
to male airline employees and because customers’ preferences for single 
stewardesses was not a valid reason for the rule, the majority (Judges 
Cummings and Kerner) held the rule unlawful.98 In dissent, Judge Stevens 
focused on the odd circumstances accompanying the case: only females 
 
94  Arthur Siddon, Stevens Shuns a Stand on ERA, Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 1975, at 1. 
95  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
96  See Nomination of John Paul Stevens to Be a Justice of the Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 81–82 (1975) (statement of Margaret Drachsler, Representative, 
NOW) [hereinafter Nomination of John Paul Stevens Hearing]; John P. MacKenzie, Women Denounce 
Stevens, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1975, at A2; Linda Mathews, Stevens Criticized by Women’s Group, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1975, at B4; NOW Leader is “Saddened” Woman Wasn’t Put on Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1975, at 20. 
97  444 F.2d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir. 1971). In addition to Sprogis, NOW representative Margaret 
Drachsler also complained about Judge Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 
487 F.2d 804, 812–14 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Nomination of John Paul Stevens 
Hearing, supra note 96, at 79–80. In Bridgeport Brass, Judge Stevens dissented in part from a majority 
opinion written by Chief Judge Swygert. The case considered whether an employer had demonstrated 
that no issue of material fact existed regarding a job reclassification that disadvantaged a female 
employee. 487 F.2d at 804. Chief Judge Swygert concluded that the record on summary judgment failed 
to preclude the possibility that the reclassification was not justified by business necessity. Id. at 808–09. 
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, thought the record sufficient to demonstrate that the company’s 
decision to reclassify the plaintiff’s position was justified by economic efficiency. Id. at 813–14 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
98  Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198. 
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were employed as stewardesses at United.99 As a result, it was impossible 
for the plaintiff to prove “but for” causation with respect to United’s 
decision to terminate her employment when she married. As Judge Stevens 
argued, “A simple test for identifying a prima facie case of discrimination 
because of sex is whether the evidence shows treatment of a person in a 
manner which but for that person’s sex would be different.”100 Judge 
Stevens recognized that the majority applied a different test, one focused on 
stereotyped attitudes toward women. While agreeing with that test as a 
matter of policy, he could find no justification for it in the statute.101 
Whether because of a changed perspective on gender discrimination 
under Title VII or for some other reason, however, Justice Stevens later 
took a more expansive position when the issue of gender stereotyping 
reached the Supreme Court. In City of Los Angeles Department of Water & 
Power v. Manhart, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court majority, cited to 
Judge Cummings’s Sprogis opinion to support the statement that “[i]t is 
now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be predicated on 
mere ‘stereotyped’ impressions about the characteristics of males and 
females.”102 For one commentator, Judge Stevens’s “early insistence on a 
readily parsed approach [in his Sprogis dissent] suggests how hesitant 
careful judges are to take on open-ended questions like just how irrational 
and significant an impediment is.”103 And perhaps it is notable that Sprogis 
itself was decided in Judge Stevens’s first year as judge on the Seventh 
Circuit; his restrained approach (albeit in dissent) to statutory interpretation 
may have reflected a hesitancy to interpret a statute in light of its broad 
purposes. In any event, his later apparent repudiation of the narrow position 
enunciated in his Sprogis dissent suggests that Judge Stevens’s 
decisionmaking on the circuit court did not provide a perfect roadmap for 
his subsequent positions on the Supreme Court. In certain cases, and as 
Justice Stevens himself has readily admitted, positions he initially held were 
altered over time as a result of his “learning on the job.”104 
 
99  Id. at 1203 (Stevens, J., dissenting). United did employ forty-eight stewards in that year, but they 
served only on certain long-distance flights and the plaintiff in Sprogis was unqualified for that service 
for reasons unrelated to sex. Id. at 1202–03. 
100  Id. at 1205. Judge Stevens’s position was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Stroud v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir. 1977). 
101  Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1205 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s view may not only be 
contemporary but also wise.”). In a footnote, however, Stevens also speculated that the policy could be 
unwise if, by removing the marriage requirement, the enlarged female applicant pool depressed wage 
levels for female workers. Id. at 1205 n.21. This observation seems odd, however, to the extent that it 
provides support for irrational or stereotypical policies simply because they sustain female wage levels, 
even if only for the segment of the female population meeting the irrational criteria.   
102  435 U.S. 702, 707 & n.13 (1978). 
103  Seth Kupferberg, Civil Rights Law and Breaking Down Patterns of Segregation: The Case of 
Nepotism, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 355, 379 (1999). 
104  Stevens, supra note 78, at 1567. 
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Two state-action cases also raised red flags for leaders in the women’s 
movement.105 Judge Stevens concluded that insufficient state action existed 
for female plaintiffs to bring their discrimination claims in both Cohen v. 
Illinois Institute of Technology106 and Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hospital.107 In 
Cohen, Judge Stevens wrote the majority opinion for a unanimous panel 
affirming the district court’s dismissal of a faculty member’s claim that she 
was denied a promotion and ultimately terminated because of her gender.108 
The sticky issue in the case involved whether the Illinois Institute of 
Technology (IIT) was a state actor for purposes of certain civil rights 
statutes (§ 1983 and § 1985).109 IIT received very modest financial support 
from the state and otherwise had no substantial connections to state 
government beyond compliance with state educational regulations. For 
these reasons, the panel held that insufficient state action existed to support 
the plaintiff’s claims.110 Nan Aron, President of the Women’s Legal Defense 
Fund, disputed Judge Stevens’s resolution of the state action issue in her 
statement to Congress during his confirmation hearings in 1975.111 The 
Cohen decision hardly constituted convincing evidence, however, that 
Judge Stevens was hostile to gender discrimination claims. His decision 
was joined by liberal Judge Swygert and affirmed the decision of the 
district court below. Motions for reconsideration by the panel and an en 
banc rehearing were unsuccessful.112 Judge Stevens’s majority opinion—
carefully crafted and embedded with detailed attention to other circuits’ 
precedents and to those of the Supreme Court—was thus apparently viewed 
as persuasive by Judge Stevens’s more liberal colleagues even on a court 
with a sustained reputation for expansive civil rights decisions. 
Finally, although Judge Stevens’s confirmation hearing followed on 
the heels of Roe v. Wade, no Senator asked the nominee a question about 
 
105  Nomination of John Paul Stevens Hearing, supra note 96, at 80–81. 
106  524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975). 
107  479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973). Women’s rights advocates also identified Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. 
Supp. 1287 (N.D. Ill. 1974), as a decision reflecting Judge Stevens’s hostility to gender equality. 
Nomination of John Paul Stevens Hearing, supra note 96, at 81. In Dyer, a three-judge district court 
presided over by Judge Stevens addressed the question of whether the Illinois House of Representatives 
could adopt a rule requiring a three-fifths majority vote to ratify a federal constitutional amendment. 390 
F. Supp. at 1288 (considering the question with respect to the Equal Rights Amendment). Stevens and 
his district court colleagues determined the matter nonjusticiable because it was not yet ripe for review: 
the state assembly had yet to vote on the amendment at the time the case was filed. Id. at 1290. 
108  524 F.2d at 821–22. 
109  Id. at 824–25. 
110  Id. at 827. Because the facts in dispute arose prior to the congressional enactment making Title 
VII applicable to educational institutions, the plaintiff’s claim could not be sustained under that statute. 
Id. at 822. 
111  See Nomination of John Paul Stevens Hearing, supra note 96, at 227 (statement of Nan Aron, 
President, Women’s Legal Defense Fund). 
112  Cohen, 524 F.2d at 830. 
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his position on abortion.113 Nevertheless, he had decided one case involving 
abortion that drew attention from advocates of women’s rights: Doe v. 
Bellin Memorial Hospital.114 Bellin Memorial Hospital did not involve the 
right to terminate a pregnancy per se, but rather involved the question of 
whether a private hospital could deny a doctor’s right to perform an 
abortion in a suit to enforce that right under § 1983. The plaintiffs argued 
that receipt of Hill–Burton funds was conditional on compliance with the 
Fourteenth Amendment and that the private hospital qualified as a state 
actor for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment under a § 1983 claim.115 
As in Cohen, Judge Stevens, joined by Judges Kiley and Pell, concluded 
that while the hospital’s receipt of federal funds was conditional on its 
compliance with certain regulations, those conditions did not pertain to the 
performance or nonperformance of abortions.116 Nor did receipt of those 
funds allow the court to conclude that the hospital acted “under color of 
state law” without evidence of greater “affirmative support” for the 
hospital’s policy regarding abortions.117 
Stevens’s decision reversed a preliminary injunction entered by the 
district court and arguably conflicted with an influential decision by the 
Fourth Circuit, Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, which 
concluded that receipt of Hill–Burton funds qualified the hospital as a state 
actor for purposes of a race discrimination suit brought by black doctors.118 
On those bases, one might conclude that his decision (even though joined 
by the more liberal Judge Kiley) created an appropriate cause for concern 
by advocates of women’s rights. But that conclusion is premature. Indeed, 
the Fourth Circuit overruled Simkins after the Supreme Court’s 1974 
 
113  For a discussion, see Linda Greenhouse, One Man, Two Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2010, at 
WK11. 
114  479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973). 
115  Id. at 757, 759–61. The Hill–Burton Act was enacted in 1946 to provide federal funds that 
enabled states to modernize their hospital systems. Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 
79-725, § 601, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2006)). 
116  Bellin Mem’l Hosp., 479 F.2d at 761. 
117  Id. at 761–62 (citing Lucas v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972)). 
118  323 F.2d 959, 960–61, 967 (4th Cir. 1963). Simkins is credited for prompting Congress to amend 
the Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 711 n.48 (1979) (“Although it has 
been suggested that the state-action doctrine in Simkins is overbroad, there is no denying that the Title 
VI Congress assumed and approved the availability of private suits against many private recipients of 
federal funds.” (citation omitted)); 110 CONG. REC. 6544 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (“The 
purpose of title VI is to make sure that funds of the United States are not used to support racial 
discrimination. In many instances the practices of segregation or discrimination, which title VI seeks to 
end, are unconstitutional. This is clearly so wherever Federal funds go to a State agency which engages 
in racial discrimination. It may also be so where Federal funds go to support private, segregated 
institutions, under the decision in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital. In all cases, such 
discrimination is contrary to national policy, and to the moral sense of the Nation. Thus, title VI is 
simply designed to insure that Federal funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution and the moral 
sense of the Nation.” (citation omitted)). 
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decision in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,119 concluding that Jackson 
did not permit such a broad interpretation of the Hill–Burton Act.120 And 
other circuits had lined up in concert with the Bellin Memorial Hospital 
decision over time. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit was the only court to find that 
receipt of Hill–Burton funds transformed a private hospital into a public one 
for purposes of constitutional claims.121 Ultimately, Judge Stevens’s 
approach was vindicated by all circuit courts that addressed the issue and by 
Supreme Court precedent. Thus the decision hardly represented a radically 
conservative decision, even at the time it was rendered.122 
C. Election Law 
Judge Stevens decided several cases involving election and political 
disputes during his time at the Seventh Circuit, but two are particularly 
notable because of their eventual influence upon his decisionmaking on the 
Supreme Court: Cousins v. City Council of Chicago,123 and Hartke v. 
Roudebush.124 
Perhaps most prominently in the Cousins case, Judge Stevens dissented 
in a race- and partisan-gerrymandering case brought by blacks, Puerto 
Ricans, and independent voters. The plaintiffs claimed vote dilution 
(through district cracking and packing) in the drawing of council districts in 
Chicago.125 In evaluating the constitutionality of the districting scheme, the 
majority focused on the legislature’s subjective intent.126 Because the 
plaintiffs had produced evidence to indicate racial intent, the majority 
remanded for a new trial on the issue of race discrimination, but concluded 
that the partisan-gerrymandering claims were nonjusticiable.127 
 
119  419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that the Pennsylvania Utility Commission was not sufficiently 
connected with Pennsylvania to constitute a state action concerning the company’s termination of 
petitioner’s electricity because the utility corporation was privately owned and operated). 
120  Modaber v. Culpeper Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 674 F.2d 1023, 1025–26 (4th Cir. 1982). 
121  See Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 424 U.S. 948, 948–49 (1976) (White, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (describing circuit conflict involving Simkins). 
122  Review of the decision reflects the careful attention Judge Stevens paid to detail, as it referred to 
arguments made in an amicus brief in a relevant Supreme Court opinion to explain how the Court’s 
decisions impliedly supported his conclusion in Bellin Memorial Hospital. See 479 F.2d at 760. 
123  466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1972). 
124  321 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1970), rev’d, 405 U.S. 15 (1972). 
125  Cousins, 446 F.2d at 832–33. “Packing” involves the concentration of voters from the opposition 
party into a single district to reduce their influence in other districts; “cracking” involves distributing 
opposition party voters across multiple districts to ensure that they have no controlling influence in any 
district. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 343 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The choice to draw a 
district line one way, not another, always carries some consequence for politics . . . . The spectrum of 
opportunity runs from cracking a group into impotent fractions, to packing its members into one district 
for the sake of marginalizing them in another.”); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153–54 (1993) 
(explaining how “packing” works). 
126  Cousins, 446 F.2d at 834–37. 
127  Id. at 841–45. 
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In a detailed dissent with extensive discussion of his rationale, Judge 
Stevens presented his approach to gerrymandering claims that eschewed the 
intent analysis pursued by the majority. Rather than focusing on evidence of 
discriminatory intent, Judge Stevens suggested that the appropriate course 
would be to evaluate more objective factors indicating whether traditional 
districting criteria—including compactness and contiguity—were used to 
draw the challenged districts.128 Where district boundaries created grotesque 
shapes, and where those shapes or patterns could be explained only through 
reference to discriminatory purposes, “the absence of a permissible basis for 
the classification could be established by proof.”129 This standard applied 
equally to racial and partisan gerrymandering claims, making Judge Stevens 
both more hostile to race cases and more responsive to those challenging 
partisan gerrymanders. 
The continuing significance of the ideas expressed in Cousins 
throughout Justice Stevens’s later career cannot be underestimated.130 
Following Cousins, Justice Stevens relied on his dissent in that case to 
bolster positions taken in twelve later cases—one on the Seventh Circuit 
and eleven on the Supreme Court.131 Time and again, Justice Stevens cited 
to Cousins in support of his position that racial- and political-
gerrymandering claims should be treated alike under the Constitution, that 
partisan gerrymanders are justiciable under his objective approach, and that 
 
128  Id. at 859–60 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
129  Id. 
130  For a thorough discussion of Justice Stevens’s Cousins dissent and its significance to Justice 
Stevens’s jurisprudence in vote dilution cases, see Pamela S. Karlan, Cousins’ Kin: Justice Stevens and 
Voting Rights, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 521 (1996). 
131  League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 474 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (finding a district drawn to disadvantage politically salient group violates 
Constitution); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 336 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that race is 
no different than other political considerations in the districting process); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 
918 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that favoring minorities is not a basis for a constitutional 
claim); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 933 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (writing that racial 
minorities should receive “neither more nor less protection than other groups”); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 
630, 677–78 & n.1 (1993) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (arguing that favoring minorities in certain 
circumstances does not give rise to a constitutional claim); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 512 (1990) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that, in a jury context, one cannot assume members of a racial group 
will always vote alike); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 516 n.9 (1989) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (finding that racial patronage, like partisan 
patronage, “is no more defensible than” political or racial gerrymandering); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 
U.S. 109, 164–65 (1986) (Powell, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(joining Justice Powell who agreed with the majority opinion that partisan gerrymandering is 
justiciable); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing political 
gerrymandering as one “species” of unconstitutional vote dilution); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 647 
& n.30 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (questioning inquiry into legislative motives); City of Mobile v. 
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 86 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (finding the constitutional 
standard to be the same for racial and political gerrymandering); Ill. State Emps. Union, Council 34 v. 
Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 568 n.14 (7th Cir. 1972). 
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gerrymanders favoring a minority do not give rise to any constitutional 
claim. The Cousins dissent also reflected Justice Stevens’s persistent view 
regarding the impropriety of assuming that members of racial minorities 
share the same political views or support the same candidates. Indeed, the 
Cousins dissent explains Justice Stevens’s later dissents from decisions in 
which the Court granted standing to white plaintiffs challenging districts 
drawn to advantage black voters: for Justice Stevens, the idea that the white 
plaintiffs could have suffered some form of expressive injury under those 
circumstances reinforced these racial stereotypes. Thus, the legacy of 
Cousins demonstrates that Justice Stevens’s principled approach to equal 
protection was clearly rooted in his Seventh Circuit experience. 
Another decision that Stevens rendered during his time on the circuit 
bench had an enduring impact on his later judgment in cases involving 
electoral politics: Hartke v. Roudebush.132 In addition to his service on 
circuit panels, Judge Stevens also participated in five three-judge district 
court panels. One of these three-judge panels decided Roudebush within 
two months of Judge Stevens’s swearing in at the Seventh Circuit. The case 
involved an action by a successful senatorial candidate to enjoin the 
continued operation of a recount commission appointed by an Indiana 
superior court. The majority enjoined the recount on grounds that it 
interfered “with the Constitutional prerogatives of the United States Senate” 
to determine the qualifications of its own members.133 Judge Stevens 
dissented on grounds that federal court interference was inappropriate 
before the state judiciary—including the Indiana Supreme Court, which had 
the opportunity to review the state and federal law issues—and that the 
parties should seek review by the Supreme Court.134 Judge Stevens’s dissent 
ultimately prevailed on appellate review by the Supreme Court,135 and 
Justice Stevens later cited this decision in reference to the position he took 
in Bush v. Gore136 during a 2007 interview.137 
 
132  See 321 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1970), rev’d, 405 U.S. 15 (1972). 
133  Id. at 1377. 
134  Id. at 1378 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (holding that Indiana courts are “perfectly capable of 
handling Indiana litigation without assistance or interference from a federal district court”). 
135  See Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972). 
136  531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
137  See Rosen, supra note 28. Rosen noted that, in Roudebush, “Stevens dissented, insisting that the 
recount procedures were perfectly fair and that the state judges should be trusted to handle the litigation 
honestly, without having their impartiality questioned by interference from federal courts.” Id. When 
Rosen asked Justice Stevens why he mentioned the Roudebush case, Justice Stevens remarked that he 
“had it very much in mind when [he] wrote Bush against Gore.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
A prequel is defined as “a work (as a novel or a play) whose story 
precedes that of an earlier work”;138 it is a “film or book about an earlier 
stage of a story or a character’s life, released because the later part of it has 
already been successful.”139 Few would dispute the notion that Justice 
Stevens’s record on the Supreme Court reflects the work of a highly 
successful jurist. But the seeds of that success were planted in the Justice’s 
prequel on the Seventh Circuit, where then-Judge Stevens developed his 
orientation toward decisionmaking and collegiality, as well as his positions 
on certain statutory or constitutional issues that he was to later follow on the 
Court. 
What does Justice Stevens’s time on the Seventh Circuit reveal? First, 
it is important to note that at the time Judge Stevens’s served, the Seventh 
Circuit had a reputation as a court that was unusually vigilant in the 
protection of civil rights and liberties.140 Although we have no direct 
evidence that his interaction with Democratic appointees on the Seventh 
Circuit influenced Justice Stevens ideologically, it is certainly possible that 
his respect for his more liberal colleagues on the circuit caused him to be 
open to alternative viewpoints and ideas. 
Second, Justice Stevens’s reputation on the Supreme Court is one of 
independence.141 But clearly Justice Stevens’s propensity to dissent began 
on the Seventh Circuit, where he was among the most frequent dissenters 
on the court. 
But while Judge Stevens dissented relatively often from opinions 
written by other active Seventh Circuit judges, they, correspondingly, 
dissented less often from his majority opinions. At the Supreme Court, 
Justice Stevens is known for “building majorities by courting his fellow 
justices . . . [through] intellectual rather than personal” methods of 
persuasion.142 The data presented here indicate that Judge Stevens was 
successful at persuading his colleagues at the Seventh Circuit well before he 
did so as a Supreme Court Justice. 
Finally, Judge Stevens’s opinions at the Seventh Circuit reveal 
interesting clues and roadmaps in some cases to positions he would later 
take at the Supreme Court. Among the themes sounded in Judge Stevens’s 
circuit opinions, one finds evidence of his interest in institutional 
competence and local democracy, in a unified approach to equal protection, 
and in a careful approach to statutory interpretation. Yet while these early 
 
138  Prequel, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prequel (last visited 
June 12, 2012). 
139  Prequel, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/prequel (last visited June 12, 
2012). 
140  Adamski & Engelman, supra note 24. 
141  See Rosen, supra note 28. 
142  Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 742 
cases reveal the origins of several of the Justice’s later stances in particular 
substantive areas, at least one case analyzed here demonstrated that the 
Justice was not rigid in his attachment to earlier decisions but was instead 
willing to adapt and change over time.143 Justice Stevens did, indeed, “learn 




143  See text accompanying supra notes 96–104 (discussing Justice Stevens’s apparent repudiation of 
his earlier dissent in Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971)). 
